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I. INTRODUCTION
“When there’s an elephant in the room, introduce him.”1
In Knick v. Township of Scott,2 the Supreme Court corrected one of
the most egregious and inexplicable blunders of its 230-year history.
For more than three decades, plaintiffs who alleged a violation of the
Takings Clause by state or local governments were barred from suing
for compensation in federal court.3 The source of this prohibition was
Justice Blackmun’s 1985 opinion in Williamson County Regional
Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City4—a decision
that most scholars and practitioners believe rested on a fundamental
misunderstanding of both constitutional text and legal procedure.5
Williamson County was not only doctrinally indefensible, but the
Court that handed down the decision apparently failed to grasp its
procedural implications. Although the opinion was rife with language
suggesting that a Fifth Amendment takings claim could be “ripened”
for federal litigation by first seeking just compensation in state court,
complying with that requirement would in fact bar the plaintiff from
pursuing the claim further in any forum, state or federal.6 It took the
Court twenty years to acknowledge this self-evident, procedural catch22 and over a decade to remedy it by overruling Williamson County.7

1. AZ QUOTES, https://www.azquotes.com/quote/364227 (last visited Feb. 26,
2021) [https://perma.cc/7EYP-ZMX4] (citing Carnegie Mellon University, Randy
Pausch Last Lecture: Achieving Your Childhood Dreams, YOUTUBE (Dec. 20,
2007), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ji5_MqicxSo [https://perma.cc/QAW9FT93]).
2. 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2162 (2019).
3. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides, “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. This provision was incorporated into
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for application to state and
local governments by Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. City of
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
4. See Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson
City, 473 U.S. 172, 172 (1985).
5. See infra note 53.
6. See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 194 (it was “premature” to file takings
claim in federal court before seeking compensation in state court); id. at 197 (federalcourt takings claim is “not yet ripe” until plaintiff has sued for compensation in state
court).
7. See San Remo Hotel v. City and County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 325
(2005) (acknowledging that complying with Williamson County could not “ripen” a
takings claim for federal adjudication, as the decision stated); See Knick v. Twp. of
Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2167 (overruling Williamson County).
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Throughout the thirty-four-year history of Williamson County, one
fact was taken for granted. Never directly mentioned but always
looming in the background of two rounds of oral argument before the
Supreme Court in Knick was the premise that relegating takings claims
to state court made it less likely that property owners would prevail on
those claims than if they could be filed in federal court in the first
instance. This Article examines that premise and finds little support
for it in the historical record.
Part I of this Article discusses Williamson County and highlights the
logical, doctrinal, and procedural confusion associated with the
opinion, both in its conception and as the consequences of the ruling
were revealed over time.8 It concludes with a brief review of the Knick
decision, which finally laid Williamson County to rest.9 Part II turns to
the “elephant in the courtroom”—the generally unspoken assumption
that reopening the federal courthouse doors to takings claims will
significantly increase the number of claims that result in awards of
compensation.10 Part II also points out that, both before Williamson
County and after, federal courts have expressed a strong distaste, if not
outright contempt, for becoming involved in land-use disputes.11 A
review of the pre-Williamson County practice of invoking abstention
to clear the federal judiciary’s calendar of takings cases12 is followed
by an examination of the extremely low success rate of takings cases
that have managed to avoid both Williamson County and abstention
and adjudicated on their merits in federal court.13 A case study of
Guggenheim v. City of Goleta14 exemplifies the Ninth Circuit’s policy
of dismissing takings challenges to regulations that predate a
plaintiff’s acquisition of title—in direct contravention of the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island.15 Finally, the Ninth
Circuit’s most recent foray into takings law, Bridge Aina Le’a v. State
of Hawaii Land-Use Commission,16 raises the question of whether the
Circuit is flouting the Seventh Amendment’s Re-examination Clause
8. See infra notes 19–71 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 72–92 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 93–117 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 118–29 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 130–65 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 166–193 and accompanying text.
14. Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 582 F.3d 996, 1037 (9th Cir. 2009)
[hereinafter Guggenheim I], vacated on reh’g en banc, Guggenheim v. City of
Goleta, 638 F.3d 1111, 1111 (9th Cir. 2010) [hereinafter Guggenheim II].
15. 533 U.S. 606, 629 (2001); see infra notes 194–217 and accompanying text.
16. 950 F.3d 610 (9th Cir. 2020), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. July 22, 2020)
(No. 20-54).
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in its eagerness to set aside jury verdicts of takings liability.17 Part IV
concludes this Article by reminding the reader that Knick has
essentially returned federal takings jurisprudence to where it stood in
1984—before Williamson County cut off its development by diverting
most takings cases to state court.18 How the federal judiciary responds
to the Knick challenge will set the parameters of takings law for the
twenty-first century.
II. THE THIRTY-YEAR MISTAKE
A. Williamson County—Laying a Minefield Without a Map
The Williamson County opinion was unique in many respects. The
Court did not decide the question presented for review. The question
the Court decided had not been briefed or argued below; the Court was
unable to find a coherent rationale for its holding, and no one had
thought through the readily foreseeable consequences of the decision.
The case arose after the denial of permits by the Williamson County
Regional Planning Commission that were required to complete the
development of a residential subdivision.19 Hamilton Bank, which had
acquired title to the project through foreclosure, sued the agency in
federal court for a regulatory taking of the undeveloped property and
was awarded compensation by a jury.20 The trial judge overturned the
damages award, but the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reinstated the
award, holding that just compensation was required for even a
temporary denial of all beneficial use of property.21 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to address the question of whether federal,
state, and local governments must pay money damages to a landowner
whose property was allegedly “taken” temporarily by the application
of government regulations.22 This question, however, was not
addressed.23 Instead, the Court created a novel “ripeness” doctrine out

17. See infra notes 218–47 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 248–51 and accompanying text.
19. Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,
473 U.S. 172, 180 (1985).
20. Id. at 175.
21. Id.; Hamilton Bank of Johnson City v. Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning
Comm’n, 729 F.2d 402, 409 (6th Cir. 1984), rev’d, 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
22. Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 185.
23. Id. (“[W]e find that the question is not properly presented, and must be left
for another day.”) That day came two years later, in First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987).
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of whole cloth—under which the federal courts could not hear
Hamilton Bank’s Fifth Amendment takings claim at all.
As a prelude, the majority found that the claim was not ripe for
adjudication because the developer had “not yet obtained a final
decision regarding the application of the zoning ordinance and
subdivision regulations to its property.”24 This first prong of
Williamson County’s new ripeness doctrine, the “finality”
requirement, unleashed a torrent of chaos and unpredictability into
takings law that persists to this day despite three subsequent Supreme
Court opinions attempting to clarify exactly what constitutes “finality”
on a case-by-case basis.25 The opinion’s inherent obscurity as to when
a land-use decision may be sufficiently final to create a ripe takings
claim has been further clouded by the courts, which have sometimes
seemed eager to create new procedural stumbling blocks to avoid
adjudicating such claims on the merits.26 An especially egregious
example was a ruling by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that an
agency’s outright prohibition of any economically beneficial use of
property was not “final” until the aggrieved property owners tried to
amend the regional land-use plan to accommodate development.27
Nevertheless, all the difficulties and uncertainties that were
generated by Williamson County’s finality requirement paled in
comparison to what came next. Having seemingly concluded his
analysis of why Hamilton Bank’s takings claim was not ripe, Justice
Blackmun continued by stating, “A second reason the taking claim is
24. Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 186. This was a puzzling statement, given that
Hamilton Bank had received a determination from the County Board of Zoning
Appeals that it was entitled to proceed with its development as originally planned.
However, “[the Regional] Planning Commission [had] refused to acknowledge that
decision. The County Attorney advised Hamilton Bank that any further resort to the
Board of Zoning Appeals would be futile, as the Planning Commission would ignore
its determination.” Michael M. Berger, Anarchy Reigns Supreme, 29 WASH. U. J.
URB. & CONTEMP. L. 39, 53 (1985)..
25. See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo Cty., 477 U.S. 340, 351–53
(1986) (holding that a property owner who is denied approval of development
allowed under existing regulations must seek approval for less intensive uses);
Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 739 (1997) (holding that an
agency’s decision is final when it has no further discretion to approve permit); City
of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, 526 U.S. 687, 698–99 (1999)
(holding that the government may not impose repetitive or unfair procedures in order
to avoid reaching a final decision).
26. See generally, Gregory Overstreet, The Ripeness Doctrine of the Taking
Clause: A Survey of Decisions Showing Just How Far Federal Courts Will Go to
Avoid Adjudicating Land Use Cases, 10 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 91, 124 (1994).
27. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 911 F.2d 1331,
1336 (9th Cir. 1990).
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not yet ripe is that respondent did not seek compensation through the
procedures the state provided for doing so.”28
This was a startling proposition that had never before been
suggested by any court and had not been considered by the Sixth
Circuit or the district court proceedings in Williamson County.29 The
sole basis for this novel, procedural rule was an amicus brief the
Solicitor General filed in the Supreme Court, which posed the
question:
Whether, under this Court’s decision in Parratt v.
Taylor . . . respondents claim that its property was
taken without just compensation in violation of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments should have been
dismissed because respondent did not pursue
procedures under state law to obtain compensation or
show that those procedures are inadequate.30
In Parratt, an inmate at a Nebraska prison ordered hobby materials
through the mail, which were delivered to the prison but disappeared
before reaching him.31 The inmate sued the warden, alleging that the
loss of the materials amounted to an unconstitutional deprivation of
28. Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 194. Although Justice Blackmun’s opinion
requires litigants to avail themselves of any “procedures” a state might make
available for obtaining compensation, this has been universally interpreted narrowly
as a requirement to file an inverse condemnation claim or its equivalent under state
law, in state court. See, e.g., Knick v. Twp. of Scott, Pa., 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2169
(characterizing the holding in Williamson County as requiring property owners to
“seek just compensation under state law in state court before bringing a federal
takings claim”); San Remo Hotel v. City of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 331
(“Because petitioners had failed to pursue an inverse condemnation action in state
court, they had not yet been denied just compensation as contemplated by
Williamson County.”).
29. See, e.g., Joshua D. Hawley, The Beginning of the End? Horne v. Department
of Agriculture and the Future of Williamson County, 2013 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 245,
246 (“[I]n no case before Williamson County did any federal or state court ever
suggest that it lacked jurisdiction to hear a takings claim, or that the claim was
somehow premature, merely because the claimant had not yet attempted to obtain
compensation from the government.”).
30. Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Williamson Cty.
Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 172 (1985) (No. 84-4),
1984 WL 565763 *1. Such a rule had previously been suggested (albeit without
analogizing to Parratt) in a law review article by William Ryckman, but there is no
evidence that either the Solicitor General or the Williamson County Court were
familiar with it. See William E. Ryckman, Jr., Land Use Litigation, Federal
Jurisdiction and the Abstention Doctrines, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 377, 395 n.104 (1981).
31. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 529 (1981).
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property without due process of law.32 The Supreme Court ruled that
the inmate’s due process rights were not violated because the loss of
his materials resulted from the “random and unauthorized” acts of the
prison’s employees, rather than from any established procedure.33
Because Nebraska tort law provided a means to recover the value of
the lost property, there was no due process violation.34
It was immediately evident that the formal denial of development
permits in Williamson County had nothing to do with due process, nor
could it plausibly have been described as a random and unauthorized
act. Hamilton Bank’s opposition brief highlighted the Solicitor
General’s faulty analogy between takings cases and the issue posed by
Parratt. The brief noted that because regulatory takings effected by
land-use agencies usually occur only after lengthy formal proceedings,
Parratt was clearly inapposite, and there was no logical bar to
immediately seek a remedy for the constitutional violation in federal
court.35 At one point, Justice Blackmun’s majority opinion seemed to
recognize the inapplicability of Parratt, noting that the Parratt rule
“does not extend to situations . . . in which the deprivation of property
is effected pursuant to an established state policy or procedure, and the
state could provide pre-deprivation process.”36 Yet even after this
concession, the opinion insisted that “Parratt’s reasoning applies here
by analogy.”37
The only other precedential basis that Williamson County could
claim for the new “state procedures” requirement was by analogy to
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,38 which Justice Blackmun cited for the
proposition that “takings claims against the federal government are
premature until the property owner has availed itself of the process
provided by the Tucker Act.”39 But this reflected an even deeper
misunderstanding of takings law than the reliance on Parratt. In
Monsanto, a titular chemical company sought to enjoin, under the
Takings Clause, provisions of a federal law that would result in the
32. Id.
33. Id. at 541.
34. Id. at 543–44.
35. Brief for Respondent Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, Williamson Cty. Reg’l
Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985) (No. 844), 1984 WL 565756, at *39.
36. Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,
473 U.S. 172, 196 n. 14 (1985).
37. Id.
38. 467 U.S. 986, 986 (1984).
39. Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 195 (citing Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1016–20).

584

TEXAS A&M J. PROP. L.

[Vol. 7

disclosure of certain trade secrets.40 The Court found that the data in
question qualified as private property, protected by the Fifth
Amendment.41 However, the equitable relief that Monsanto sought
was not available to enjoin a taking by the federal government;
Monsanto’s exclusive remedy was to file suit for just compensation in
the Court of Federal Claims, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (the
“Tucker Act”).42 Thus, Monsanto’s claim for equitable relief was not
“premature” in the ordinary sense of the word. Williamson County’s
reliance on Monsanto was clearly intended to suggest, as noted at the
time, “that suit in the [Court of Federal Claims] is some kind of
precondition to suit in district court.”43 But the Court of Federal
Claims is the only forum with jurisdiction to hear takings claims
against the federal government in excess of $10,000.44 Monsanto’s
claim was not barred for being premature; the claim was barred
because the company failed to do what the plaintiff in Williamson
County did—seek just compensation in a federal court with
jurisdiction over the claim.
Stripped of the inapt analogies to Parratt and Monsanto, the only
support for the state litigation requirement was Justice Blackmun’s
self-evident, yet seemingly vacuous, observation that “[t]he Fifth
Amendment does not proscribe the taking of property; it proscribes
taking without just compensation.”45 Obviously, plaintiffs do not bring
suit for a violation of the Takings Clause unless they can allege a
taking without just compensation; that is the gravamen of the
complaint. The Court in Williamson County chose to address the
following question: What is the proper court to adjudicate takings
claims? Justice Blackmun’s tautological recitation of the
constitutional text sheds no light whatsoever on that issue.46 Justice
Blackmun only provides the following insight:
40. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 998–99.
41. Id. at 1001–1004.
42. Id. at 1016–1019.
43. Berger, supra note 24, at 57.
44. The Tucker Act assigns to the Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction over “any
claim against the United States founded upon . . . the Constitution,” 28
U.S.C. 1491(a)(1) (2011), and this jurisdiction is exclusive for claims over $10,000.
28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(2) (2013).
45. Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,
473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985).
46. See, e.g., John Martinez & Karen L. Martinez, A Prudential Theory for
Providing a Forum for Federal Takings Claims, 36 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 445,
460 (2001) (“[I]t makes sense that a claimant must ask for and be denied
compensation before the judicial machinery may be mobilized to determine whether
the government has violated the Just Compensation Clause. However, the person

2021]

KNICK AND THE ELEPHANT IN THE COURTROOM

585

The key to this logical puzzle apparently lies in the
opinion’s assertion that [B]ecause the Constitution
does not require pre-taking compensation and is
instead satisfied by a reasonable and adequate
provision for obtaining compensation after the taking,
the State’s action here is not “complete” until the State
fails to provide adequate compensation for the taking.47
By referring to both the county planning commission and the
Tennessee state courts as “the State”, Justice Blackmun implied some
sort of functional identity between the agency committing the taking
(the commission) and a possible source of a compensation remedy (the
state judiciary). But the identification of the two public entities is
plainly spurious.48 In most cases, as in Williamson County, takings are
effected by actions of the executive branch of the local government—
city or county boards and commissions.49 These entities are legally,
functionally, and fiscally distinct from the judicial branch. If Hamilton
Bank prevailed in a state, inverse condemnation action against the
regional planning commission, the state court would not provide
compensation.50 Rather, the state court would order the commission to
from whom, or entity from which, the claimant should request compensation, and in
what forum, remain undetermined.”).
47. Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 195 (emphasis added).
48. As Luke Wake has noted, “under this interpretive theory, state courts were
viewed as active participants in facilitating a constitutional violation.” Luke A.
Wake, Righting a Wrong: Assessing the Implications of Knick v. Township of Scott,
14 CHARLESTON L. REV. 205, 217 (forthcoming, Winter 2020). Viewed differently,
Williamson County treated local governments as though they were mere appendages
of state government. See Robert H. Thomas, Sublimating Home Rule and Municipal
Separation of Powers in Knick v. Township of Scott, 47 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 509,
512–13 (2020).
49. See, e.g., Michael B. Kent, Jr., Weakening the “Ripeness Trap” for Federal
Takings Claims: Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head and Town of Nags Head v.
Toloczko, 65 S.C. L. REV. 935, 945 (2014) (“[I]n most cases, the ‘government’ will
be the state or local agency doing the alleged taking. The state judicial system, by
contrast, provides a forum to remedy the uncompensated taking, just like a federal
court does.”) (footnote omitted).
50. For purposes of this hypothetical, we leave aside the fact that inverse
condemnation was not available under Tennessee state law, as Hamilton Bank
informed the Court at the time. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Williamson Cty.
Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985)
(No. 84-4), 1985 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 76, at 16–18. Compensation for a regulatory
taking under Tennessee state law would not be available until nearly 30 years after
Williamson County. See Phillips v. Montgomery Cty., 442 S.W.3d 233, 242–44
(Tenn. 2014).
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do so—exactly as a federal court would and, in fact, did. If the
foregoing passage in Williamson County read, “the planning
commission’s action here is not ‘complete’ until the Tennessee state
courts fail to order it to provide adequate compensation for the taking,”
the non sequitur would have been obvious. A taking without just
compensation occurred when the commission denied permits to
develop the property and failed to provide compensation for the
owner’s loss. Thereafter, any court of competent jurisdiction, state or
federal, could enforce the terms of the Fifth Amendment and order the
commission to pay. The simple truism that the Fifth Amendment
proscribes only takings without just compensation offers no insight at
all as to the proper court in which compensation should be sought. Yet
those words would be seized upon for decades, by federal courts
throughout the country, as somehow justifying the dismissal of
property owners’ federal constitutional claims seeking to establish that
their property in fact was taken without just compensation.51
The logical flaws and non sequiturs in Williamson County were so
many and so glaring that the decision immediately became the target
of sharp criticism from both scholars and practitioners.52 A steady
51. See, e.g., Downing/Salt Pond Partners, L.P. v. Rhode Island & Providence
Plantations, 643 F.3d 16, 20 (1st Cir. 2011) (finding federal takings claim unripe
because “the Fifth Amendment ‘does not proscribe the taking of property; it
proscribes taking without just compensation.’”) (quoting Williamson County, 473
U.S. at 194); Peters v. Village of Clifton, 498 F.3d 727, 730 (7th Cir. 2007)
(dismissing landowner’s regulatory takings claim from federal court as unripe for
failure to pursue state litigation because “no constitutional violation occurs until just
compensation has been denied.” (quoting Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 195
n.13)); Henry v. Jefferson Cnty. Planning Comm’n, 34 F. App’x 92, 95–96 (4th Cir.
2002) (dismissing federal takings claim as unripe under Williamson County’s state
procedural requirement because “the mere taking of a landowner’s property does not
violate the Fifth Amendment; the violation occurs only when the property is taken
and the landowner has been denied just compensation.”); Macene v. MJW, Inc., 951
F.2d 700, 704 (6th Cir. 1991) (finding federal takings claim unripe because where
“a state provides an adequate procedure for seeking just compensation, the property
owner cannot claim a violation of the Just Compensation Clause until it has used the
procedure and been denied just compensation.”) (quoting Williamson County, 473
U.S. at 195)); Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass’n v. City of Simi Valley, 882 F.2d 1398,
1402 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding physical takings claim unripe because “‘[t]he Fifth
Amendment does not proscribe the taking of property; it proscribes taking without
just compensation’”) (quoting Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 194), overruled on
other grounds by Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1326 (9th Cir. 1996); see
also Kathryn E. Kovacs, Accepting the Relegation of Takings Claims to State
Courts: The Federal Courts’ Misguided Attempts to Avoid Preclusion under
Williamson County, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 10 n.49 (1999) (listing additional cases);
Overstreet, supra note 26, at 117 n.160 (listing additional cases).
52. See Berger, supra note 24, at 39–40; see also Henry Paul Monaghan, State
Law Wrongs, State Law Remedies, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 86 COLUM. L.
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stream of critical commentary ensued over the next thirty years.53 This
continuing interest in the case was fueled, at least in part, by the
gradual revelation of unforeseen consequences of the decision—most
of them detrimental to the ability of property owners to redress
violations of their Fifth Amendment rights.
B. Ripeness or Rot? Williamson County Evolved in Ways Both
Unforeseen and Inevitable
Because the ramifications of Williamson County had not adequately
been thought through before the decision was handed down, the
opinion evolved in practice in unforeseen ways. Although Justice
Blackmun’s opinion seemed clear that failure to comply with the new
ripeness requirements deprived district courts of Article III
jurisdiction to hear a takings claim,54 subsequent cases began to refer
to the doctrine as a “prudential” rule.55 After this development, federal
REV. 979, 989–90 (1986).
53. See generally, e.g., R. S. Radford & Jennifer Fry Thompson, The Accidental
Abstention Doctrine: After Thirty Years, the Case for Diverting Federal Takings
Claims to State Court under Williamson County Has Yet to Be Made, 67 BAYLOR
L. REV. 567, 567 (2015); Michael M. Berger, The Ripeness Game: Why Are We Still
Forced to Play?, 30 TOURO L. REV. 297, 297 (2014); J. David Breemer, The Rebirth
of Federal Takings Review? The Courts’ ‘Prudential’ Answer to Williamson
County’s Flawed State Litigation Ripeness Requirement, 30 TOURO L. REV. 319,
319 (2014); Hawley, supra note 29; J. David Breemer, You Can Check Out But You
Can Never Leave: The Story of the San Remo Hotel—The Supreme Court Relegates
Federal Takings Claims to State Courts Under a Rule Intended to Ripen the Claims
for Federal Review, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 247, 247 (2006); Scott A. Keller,
Note, Judicial Jurisdiction Stripping Masquerading as Ripeness: Eliminating the
Williamson County State Litigation Requirement for Regulatory Takings Claims, 85
TEX. L. REV. 199, 199 (2006); Michael M. Berger & Gideon Kanner, Shell Game!
You Can’t Get There from Here: Supreme Court Ripeness Jurisprudence in Takings
Cases at Long Last Reaches the Self-Parody Stage, 36 URB. LAW. 671, 671 (2004);
J. David Breemer, Overcoming Williamson County’s Troubling State Procedures
Rule: How The England Reservation, Issue Preclusion Exceptions, and the
Inadequacy Exception Open the Federal Courthouse Door to Ripe Takings Claims,
18 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 209, 209 (2003); Peter A. Buchsbaum, Should Land
Use Be Different? Reflection on Williamson County Regional Planning Board v.
Hamilton Bank, in TAKING SIDES ON TAKINGS ISSUES 471 (Thomas E. Roberts ed.,
2002); Michael M. Berger, Supreme Bait & Switch: The Ripeness Ruse in
Regulatory Takings, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 99, 99 (2000); Gregory Overstreet,
Update on the Continuing and Dramatic Effect of the Ripeness Doctrine on Federal
Land Use Litigation, 20 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 25, 25 (1997).
54. See, e.g., Austin v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 840 F.2d 678, 682 (9th Cir.
1988) (“Williamson County affects our jurisdiction to hear takings claims. . . ‘A
court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is without
jurisdiction.’”) (emphasis added; citation omitted).
55. See, e.g., Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 733–34
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judges were free to decide whether to adjudicate regulatory takings
claims on a case-by-case basis. Although most federal judges
continued to decline to do so, a new element of uncertainty was created
by the possibility that, in any random case, Williamson County’s state
litigation requirement might be waived.56
Even more troubling – at least to aggrieved property owners – was
the Court’s decision in City of Chicago v. International College of
Surgeons.57 That 1997 opinion, which did not so much as mention
Williamson County, upheld the jurisdiction of a federal court to
adjudicate a regulatory takings claim that washad been removed from
state court by the municipal defendant.58 City of Chicago thereby
created a unique procedural asymmetry: property owners seeking to
file takings claims against local jurisdictions were barred from federal
court under Williamson County, but City of Chicago guaranteed
unimpeded access to federal court for governmental defendants in
those same cases who asserted removal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1441(a).
But by far the most damning indictment of Williamson County’s
slipshod underpinnings was the fact that neither the Court nor any
party before it considered the relationship between the new state
procedures doctrine and ordinary principles of claim and issue
preclusion.59 The opinion repeatedly emphasized that the plaintiff’s
takings claim was not barred outright from federal court. Because the
claim was “not yet ripe,”60 it was merely “premature” to file in that
forum before utilizing the state courts.61 As one Supreme Court
litigator put it, “There simply is no rational way for an English
(1997) (explaining Williamson County established “two independent prudential
hurdles to a regulatory takings claim brought against a state entity in federal court.”)
(emphasis added).
56. See, e.g., Yamagiwa v. City of Half Moon Bay, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1108–
10 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (holding that Williamson County was waived when a municipal
defendant removed a takings claim from state to federal court, and then sought to
have the case dismissed as unripe).
57. 522 U.S. 156, 156 (1997).
58. Id. at 160–61, 174.
59. Claim preclusion (res judicata) bars the subsequent litigation of claims that
were, or could have been, brought in a previous judicial proceeding between the
same parties. Issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) bars the subsequent litigation of
issues of fact or law that were resolved in a previous judicial proceeding between
the parties. regardless of the claims in which they arose. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS §§ 17, 27 (AM. LAW INST. 1982).
60. Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,
473 U.S. 172, 197 (1985).
61. Id. at 194.
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speaking person to read Williamson County other than holding that
property owners can satisfy those newly minted ripeness requirements
and thereby render their claim ripe for federal court litigation.”62 The
possibility that once a plaintiff unsuccessfully sought compensation in
state court the taking claim would be barred from subsequent federal
litigation is not hinted at in Williamson County, and was apparently
never raised when the case was before the Court.63
However, it quickly became clear that the state procedures
requirement was incompatible with long-standing preclusion doctrine.
Once a Fifth Amendment takings claim has been litigated in state court
in compliance with Williamson County, the Full Faith and Credit Act
requires federal courts to apply that state’s preclusion doctrines to any
further litigation between the parties involving the same claim or
issues.64 In most cases, this would prevent a federal court from hearing
a takings claim at all.65 The fundamental premise underlying
Williamson County’s state procedures rule—that submitting a federal
takings claim to state court would “ripen” it for subsequent litigation
in federal court—turned out to be a procedural impossibility. Far from
ripening such a claim, complying with Williamson County would
effectively extinguish it.66
62. Berger, Supreme Bait & Switch, supra note 53, at 105; see also Stewart E.
Sterk & Michael C. Pollack, A Knock on Knick’s Revival of Federal Takings
Litigation, 72 FLA. L. REV. 419 (2020) (“The Williamson County opinion appeared
to contemplate that a landowner could ripen a federal court takings claim by seeking
all relief available under state law.”) To regulatory advocates, the distinction
between ripening a claim and being permanently barred from federal court may seem
no more than a “quibble over terminology.” See John Echeverria, Knick v. Township
of Scott: Takings Advocates’ Nonsensical Forum Shopping Agenda, CPR BLOG,
(Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.progressivereform.org/cpr-blog/knick-v-township-ofscott-takings-advocates-nonsensical-forum-shopping-agenda/
[https://perma.cc/C3HD-2R8V]. But to property owners attempting to enforce their
rights under the Fifth Amendment, divining the actual meaning of Williamson
County was a matter of some urgency.
63. See Br. for Resp’t Hamilton Bank, supra note 35, at *68–9; Br. for United
States, supra note 30; Tr. of Oral Arg., supra note 50; Library of Congress: Harry A
Blackmun Papers, Box No. 425, case folder 84-4 (containing Justice Blackmun’s
notes of issues raised before, during, and after oral argument of Williamson County).
64. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012).
65. See, e.g., Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 80–85
(1984) (reviewing competing policy objectives of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Full
Faith and Credit Act, concluding that allowing litigants to bring their state claims in
state court and return to federal court to litigate their federal claims “may seem
attractive from a plaintiff’s perspective, [but] it is not the system established by
‘1738.’”).
66. See, e.g., Berger, Supreme Bait & Switch, supra note 53, at 102 (“[T]he very
act of ripening a case also ends it.”).
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Twenty years after Williamson County was handed down, the High
Court finally acknowledged what no one had thought of in 1985: that
the practical effect of the state procedures requirement was to
permanently deny access to federal court for most plaintiffs with Fifth
Amendment takings claims against local governments. In San Remo
Hotel v. City and County of San Francisco, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to finally confront the question of whether issue preclusion
permanently bars a takings claim from federal court, solely because
the plaintiff complied with Williamson County’s state procedures
requirement.67
In language hinting that the plaintiffs were engaged in some kind of
procedural trickery, Justice Stevens’s unanimous opinion framed the
issue as one of “giving losing litigants access to an additional appellate
tribunal,”68 and proclaimed that the Ninth Circuit was correct to
decline petitioner’s invitation to ignore the requirements of [the Full
Faith and Credit Act].”69 Absent from the opinion was any explanation
of why Fifth Amendment takings plaintiffs should be required to
litigate their claims in state court in the first place. Although the Court
in San Remo Hotel unanimously agreed that the usual effect of the
state procedures rule would be to permanently bar federal
constitutional claims from federal court, no attempt was made to
ground this outcome in traditional principles of ripeness—or any other
doctrine.
San Remo Hotel brought the most disconcerting aspect of
Williamson County into sharp focus: over the entire thirty-four years
of its existence, neither the Supreme Court nor any lower court
applying the state procedures requirement was able to advance any
intelligible rationale for the rule.70 Moreover, a four-justice
concurrence, penned by Chief Justice Rehnquist, objected that “the
justifications for [the] state litigation requirement are suspect, while
67. San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 326 (2005).
68. Id. at 345.
69. Id. at 347–48.
70. Some regulatory advocates have attempted to find a post-hoc grounding for
the state procedures rule in principles of federalism. See, e.g., Note, Fifth
Amendment-Takings Clause-State Litigation Requirement-Knick v. Township of
Scott, 133 Harv. L. Rev. 322, 330 (2019); Stewart E. Sterk, The Demise of Federal
Takings Litigation, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 251, 299–300 (2006). However, not
only did Williamson County itself make no mention of federalism, such a rationale
would negate “the whole point of Section 1983.” Michael M. Berger, What’s
Federalism Got to Do with Regulatory Takings?, 8 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS.
CONF. J. 9, 30 (2019); see also Radford & Thompson, supra note 53, at 613-17
(discussing the inapplicability of federalism-based rationales to Williamson County).

2021]

KNICK AND THE ELEPHANT IN THE COURTROOM

591

its impact on takings plaintiffs is dramatic” and called for the rule to
be reconsidered “[i]n an appropriate case.”71 Yet inexplicably, another
fourteen years passed and three of the four San Remo Hotel justices
who called for reconsideration left the bench before the Court decided
that Knick was the “appropriate case.”
C. Knick Finally Drives a Stake Through Williamson County
It is remarkable that Williamson County’s state litigation
requirement remained good law for thirty-four years in light of its lack
of doctrinal basis, devasting effect on property owners, and lack of
coherent defense from its supporters. Over most of that time, petitions
were regularly filed asking the Court to reconsider the rule and just as
regularly were denied.72 The Court finally determined to remedy its
error in Knick v. Township of Scott—a case from the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals that seemed rather mundane compared to many that
had fallen afoul of Williamson County in the past.73
The dispute in Knick stemmed from an ordinance the Township of
Scott, Pennsylvania, enacted, requiring all cemeteries to be open and
accessible to the public.74 Rose Mary Knick was notified that she
violated the measure because grave markers were found on her ninetyacre farm, which was decidedly not open to the public.75 After
unsuccessfully seeking an injunction, Mrs. Knick sued the township
in federal court on the grounds that the public access requirement
amounted to a taking of her property in violation of the Fifth
Amendment.76 The district court dismissed the complaint as unripe
under Williamson County, and the Third Circuit, while acknowledging
that the ordinance was “extraordinary and constitutionally suspect,”
affirmed.77 The Supreme Court granted certiorari “to reconsider the
holding of Williamson County that property owners must seek just

71. San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. at 352 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the
judgment).
72. See, e.g., Wayside Church v. Van Buren Cty., 847 F.3d 812, 812 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 380 (2017); Arrigoni Enters., LLC v. Town of Durham, 18
F. Supp. 3d 188 (D. Conn. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1409 (2016); Alto Eldorado
P’ship v. Cty. of Santa Fe, 634 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 880
(2011).
73. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2162 (2019).
74. Id. at 2168..
75. Id.
76. Id. at 2168–69.
77. Id. at 2169.
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compensation under state law in state court before bringing a federal
takings claim.”78
Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion announced what should
have been a self-evident rule: “[A] property owner has a claim for a
violation of the Takings Clause as soon as a government takes his
property for public use without paying for it.”79 In overruling the 1985
decision, the Chief Justice noted, “Williamson County was not just
wrong. Its reasoning was exceptionally ill founded and conflicted with
much of our takings jurisprudence.”80
The Knick Court brushed aside the central fallacy of Williamson
County—the conflation of a state’s judicial system with local
government agencies as a singular conceptual “state” entity. The right
to compensation under the Fifth Amendment arises at the time an
agency takes private property for public use, regardless of available
post-taking remedies and regardless of what a state court might or
might not have to say about it.81 The opinion gave similarly short shrift
to Williamson County’s inapt analogy to Monsanto and suits in the
Court of Federal Claims, noting bluntly: “The [Williamson County]
Court was simply confused.”82 Highlighting the double standard
implicit in Williamson County, the Chief Justice noted that the effect
of Knick would be to “restor[e] takings claims to the full-fledged
constitutional status the Framers envisioned when they included the
[Takings] Clause among the other protections in the Bill of Rights.”83
Practitioners and commentators who dealt with the confusion,
contradictions, and outright injustices of Williamson County for over
three decades found the reasoning of Knick obvious and
straightforward.84 Nevertheless, Justice Kagan’s dissent saw the
Williamson County doctrine as unproblematic, even with the
retrospective understanding that it permanently bars plaintiffs with

78. Id.
79. Id. at 2170.
80. Id. at 2178.
81. Id. at 2170–71.
82. Id. at 2174.
83. Id. at 2170.
84. See, e.g., R. S. Radford, Best Takings Decision We Should Never Have
Needed, S.F. DAILY J., July 3, 2019, at 7 (“The holding in Knick “seems so obvious
that it should never have needed to be said.”); Michael M. Berger, Ding Dong, the
Witch Is Dead!, S.F. DAILY J., June 24, 2019, at 7 (“[T]he clear logic of the majority
opinion gives one pause to question why it took . . . [34 years] to see the errors at
the heart of Williamson County and to acknowledge the unfairness being inflicted
on one specific class of constitutional plaintiffs.”).
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constitutional claims from seeking a remedy in federal court.85 The
dissent leaned heavily on a nineteenth century case, Cherokee Nation
v. Southern Kansas Railway Co.86 Cherokee Nation addressed the
constitutionality of an Act of Congress authorizing a railroad across
part of the Indian Territory and establishing an elaborate, multi-tiered
system to appraise the value of the easement taken to provide
compensation to the tribe. It was in that context that Justice Harlan’s
opinion observed:
[The Takings Clause] does not provide or require that
compensation shall be actually paid in advance of the
occupancy of the land to be taken. But the owner is
entitled to reasonable, certain and adequate provision
for obtaining compensation before his occupancy is
disturbed. Whether a particular provision be sufficient
to secure the compensation to which, under the
Constitution, he is entitled, is sometimes a question of
difficulty. In the present case, the requirements of the
Constitution have, in our judgment, been fully met.87
These remarks addressed an exercise of direct condemnation, in which
compensation to the landowners was expressly acknowledged and
provided for in the Act itself. To apply the same language to inverse
condemnation, as the Knick dissent does—interpreting it to mean no
liability for the taking is incurred until a state court passes on the
question of whether any compensation will be paid at all—entails a
conceptual leap that could not have been contemplated by the
Cherokee Nation Court.88
Irrespective of Justice Kagan’s misplaced appeal to precedent, the
Knick dissent maintained that an alleged violation of the Fifth
85. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2180 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
86. See id. at 2182; Cherokee Nation v. S. Kan. Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641, 659
(1890).
87. S. Kan. Ry. Co., 135 U.S. at 659.
88. Knick, 139 S. Ct at 2182–83 (Kagan, J., dissenting); see also Ilya Somin,
Knick v. Township of Scott: Ending a Catch-22 that Barred Takings Cases from
Federal Court, CATO SUP. CT. REV., 2018-2019, at 153, 178 (“There can be no such
advance assurance of ‘reasonable, certain and adequate’ compensation in a case
where the government denies that any compensation is due in the first place.”);
Wake, supra note 48, at 229 (Cherokee Nation “would seem to speak only to cases
in which the government has acknowledged that it is using the power of eminent
domain and has made allowance for the payment of fair market value of the
condemned land, as was contemplated with the enactment then in question.”).
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Amendment, brought under section 1983, “more properly belongs” in
state court because state judges are more familiar with state law.89 This
argument had already been raised by Justice Stevens in San Remo
Hotel, where it was skewered by Chief Justice Rehnquist:
[T]he Court has not explained why we should hand
authority over federal takings claims to state courts,
based simply on their relative familiarity with local
land-use decisions and proceedings, while allowing
plaintiffs to proceed directly to federal court in cases
involving, for example, challenges to municipal
land-use regulations based on the First Amendment, or
the Equal Protection Clause.90
On a more general level, Justice Kagan’s position was rebutted 55
years earlier, in Justice William O. Douglas’s concurring opinion in
England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners:
[T]he complexity of local law to federal judges is
inherent in the federal court system as designed by
Congress. Resolution of local law questions is implicit
in diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. Since Erie R.
Co. v. Tompkins, the federal courts under that head of
jurisdiction daily have the task of determining what the
state law is. The fact that those questions are complex
and difficult is no excuse for a refusal by the District
Court to entertain the suit.91
But whatever one makes of the view that state judges should
adjudicate federal constitutional claims because of their familiarity
with the subject matter, it is no longer the law after Knick.

89. Knick, 139 S. Ct at 2187; see also Note, Fifth Amendment-Takings ClauseState Litigation Requirement-Knick v. Township of Scott, supra note 70, at 330
(suggesting that federal judges, as opposed to their state-court counterparts, might
be unable to determine the content of a state’s common law of property, thereby
inadvertently destroying property rights while attempting to protect them).
90. San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 350–51 (Rehnquist,
C.J., concurring in the judgment) (internal citations omitted).
91. England v. La. State Board of Med. Exam’rs, 375 U.S. 411, 426 (1964)
(Douglas, J., concurring).
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III. THE ELEPHANT IN THE COURTROOM—WILL FEDERAL COURTS
RISE TO THE CHALLENGE?
A. Both Supporters and Critics of Knick Assume the Decision Will
Lead to More Successful Takings Lawsuits
Although virtually no analysts defended the doctrinal basis of the
state litigation requirement during the thirty-four years of Williamson
County’s existence, many insisted that the rule did no harm because
state judges would uphold the constitutional rights of property owners
as vigorously as their federal counterparts.92 This “presumed parity of
state and federal courts for the litigation of federal rights”93 underlays
Justice Stevens’s dismissive remark in San Remo Hotel in which he
states, “it is entirely unclear why [petitioners’] preference for a federal
forum should matter for constitutional or statutory purposes.”94
This narrative evaporated the moment Knick raised the prospect that
property owners might once again be allowed to pursue Fifth
Amendment takings claims in their choice of forum. Instead of
continuing to assert the equivalence of state and federal courts,
regulatory advocates portrayed Knick as ushering in extensive new
financial liability for local agencies whose restrictive land-use
regulations (which would be upheld in state court) could not survive
constitutional scrutiny by federal judges. Senator Sheldon Whitehouse
railed in The National Law Journal that the Knick Court was acting as
“delivery boys for big Republican donor interests.”95 The decision was
cast as a “big prize” for “big-money developers and regulated
industries.”96 These nefarious characters supposedly spent hundreds
of millions of dollars in “dark money” to achieve this “massive victory
for the partisan donor interests seeking to control our courts.”97
Similarly, Jonathan Zasloff, posting on the Legal Planet blog, labeled
Knick the “Roy Cohn case.”98 For those too young to recognize the
92. See, e.g., Kovacs, supra note 51, at 47 (“If state courts can be trusted to
protect the interests of criminal defendants, surely they can be trusted to fairly
resolve the claims of property owners.”).
93. Jamison E. Colburn, Splitting the Atom of Property: Rights Experimentalism
as Obligation to Future Generations, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1411, 1436 (2009).
94. San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. at 344.
95. Sheldon Whitehouse, Why the ‘Knick’ Ruling Signals a New Day, NAT’L L.
J.
(July
24,
2019,
2:53
PM),
https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2019/07/24/why-the-knick-rulingsignals-a-new-day/ [https://perma.cc/24WR-8AND].
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Jonathan Zasloff, Roy Cohn Meets the Takings Clause, LEGAL PLANET (Mar.
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reference, Zasloff explained, “Roy Cohn was one of the most
disgusting figures of 20th century American law.”99 The reason for
these virulent reactions was straightforward: reopening the federal
courthouse doors to takings claims meant, according to Zasloff, that
“we will start seeing more private property owners winning these
cases.”100
Zasloff offered no explanation for why the number of successful
takings claims would increase when property owners were once again
allowed access to federal courts. Whitehouse broadly implied that
federal judges would be more likely to uphold property owners’
constitutional rights because the federal judiciary, or a growing
portion of it, is corrupt—”handpicked to favor corporations.”101 Never
mind that almost none of the takings plaintiffs who have prevailed at
the Supreme Court have been corporations, while several corporations
and other large business interests have lost.102
In addition to his “corporate influence” narrative, Senator
Whitehouse advanced a more substantive account of why state court
judges would be less likely to uphold property owners’ rights than
their federal counterparts. He maintained that state courts offer a more
difficult forum in which to litigate takings claims because state judges
allegedly care more “about things such as affordable housing and
environmental protection—stuff Americans want their government to
4, 2019), https://legal-planet.org/2019/03/04/roy-cohn-meets-the-takings-clause/
[https://perma.cc/F8Z8-MLAM].
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Sheldon Whitehouse, Why the ‘Knick’ Ruling Signals a New Day, NAT’L L.
J.
(July
24,
2019,
2:53
PM),
https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2019/07/24/why-the-knick-rulingsignals-a-new-day/ [https://perma.cc/24WR-8AND].
102. Compare, Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (prevailing plaintiff was
a farm owner), Horne v. Dep’t of Agriculture, 576 U.S. 350 (2015) (prevailing
plaintiff was a raisin grower), Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570
U.S. 595 (2013) (prevailing plaintiff was an individual property owner), Palazzolo
v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (prevailing plaintiff was an individual property
owner), Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725 (1997)
(prevailing plaintiff was a widowed homeowner), Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (prevailing plaintiff was an individual property
owner), Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (prevailing plaintiff was a
small business owner), and First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale
v. Cty. of L.A., 482 U.S. 304 (prevailing plaintiff was a local church), with Lingle
v. Chevron USA Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005) (losing plaintiff was a petroleum refining
and distribution corporation), Keystone Bituminous Coal Assoc. v. DeBenedictis,
480 U.S. 470 (losing plaintiff was an association of coal producers), and Penn
Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (losing plaintiff was
a major transportation holding company).
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do with its eminent domain power.”103 Of course, regulatory takings
claims, such as the one in Knick, have nothing to do with the exercise
of eminent domain except insofar as the government has chosen not to
exercise it. If the Township of Scott wanted to condemn an easement
across Mrs. Knick’s land for the benefit of the public who wished to
view the gravesites on her property, the Township had (and still has)
the authority to do so under its power of eminent domain, paying Mrs.
Knick the fair market value of the easement in accordance with
standard principles of condemnation law.104 Regulatory takings,
however, involve inverse condemnation—whereby the government
imposes a use on private property for the public benefit but declines
to pay for it.105 The purposes for which the government wants to take
the property, so long as they satisfy the “public use” requirement, are
immaterial to the constitutional analysis. Stripped of the inapt
reference to eminent domain, Senator Whitehouse seemed suggest that
state judges are more likely than their federal counterparts to uphold
uncompensated takings of property, in contravention of the Fifth
Amendment, simply because they approve of the purpose for which
the property is taken.
Senator Whitehouse offered no documentation to support his theory
of why takings plaintiffs are more likely to lose in state court, but he
agrees on this point with many property-rights advocates who expect
more rulings in favor of takings claimants now that Knick reopened
the federal courthouse doors. For example, Richard Epstein, author of
the landmark 1985 book, Takings,106 is confident that “[t]his new
jurisdictional option will result in some large judgments against local
governments, and it doubtless will introduce a welcome note of
103. Sheldon Whitehouse, Why the ‘Knick’ Ruling Signals a New Day, NAT’L L.
J.
(July
24,
2019,
2:53
PM),
https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2019/07/24/why-the-knick-rulingsignals-a-new-day/ [https://perma.cc/24WR-8AND]. For a more nuanced
hypothesis, see David A. Dana, Not Just a Procedural Case: The Substantive
Implications of Knick for State Property Law and Federal Takings Doctrine (Nw.
Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 19-11; Nw. Pub. Law Research Paper No. 19-26)
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3508857
or
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3508857
(Knick may “move the courts toward a more property-rights-protective, procompensation version of substantive federal Takings doctrine,” one which could
“deprive state and local regulators of flexibility that they require for effective
adaptation to climate change.”).
104. See, e.g., EMINENT DOMAIN: A HANDBOOK OF CONDEMNATION LAW 17
(William Scheiderich et al. eds., 2011).
105. See, e.g., STEVEN J. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS 1-6 (5th ed., 2012).
106. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).
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caution in local governments by exposing them to more powerful legal
relief.”107
These expectations have an obvious plausibility based on
widespread skepticism concerning the objectivity of state courts in
adjudicating constitutional claims against local governmental entities.
In a classic 1977 article in the Harvard Law Review, Burt Neuborne
argued that federal courts are generally more inclined toward federal
constitutional litigants for institutional reasons, including their
insulation from local political pressures.108 Years before Williamson
County, William Ryckman observed that property owners were
turning to the federal judiciary more frequently to escape “local bias
against federal [constitutional] claims,”109 believing that the likelihood
of successfully asserting their Fifth Amendment rights would be
undermined by “political and psychological pressures affecting state
courts.”110 By its nature, a regulatory takings claim typically entails a
landowner seeking to impose financial liability upon a local
government. Viewed in that light:
[A]n almost certain prejudice is created by having an
elected or appointed state judge, sitting in the same
local area as the alleged taking, decide the case. In
contrast, federal judges who enjoy life-tenure are far
more likely to be removed from local biases.111
In those states (the large majority)112 where judges must stand for
election, “[p]otential bias by state courts is more than just a theoretical
problem given the reality that many state judges . . . have close ties to
state parties and political leaders who adopt policies that result in
regulatory takings.”113 Under the Williamson County regime, many
107. Richard Epstein, A Quiet Revolution in Property Rights, RICOCHET.COM
(July 2, 2019), https://ricochet.com/636016/a-quiet-revolution-in-property-rights/
[https://perma.cc/2GPV-HVRA].
108. Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1120–21 (1977).
109. Ryckman, supra note 30, at 378.
110. Id. at 379.
111. Overstreet, supra note 26, at 92–93.
112. See State-by-State Summary of Judicial Selection, USLEGAL.COM,
https://courts.uslegal.com/selection-of-judges/state-by-state-summary-of-judicialselection/ [https://perma.cc/ZY45-W6SX].
113. Somin, supra note 88, at 182; see also Brian T. Hodges, Knick v. Township
of Scott, Pa: How a Graveyard Dispute Resurrected the Fifth Amendment’s Takings
Clause, 60 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 25 (2020) (“Federal judges are typical[ly]
viewed as being more removed from local politics than their state counterparts (a
vast majority of whom are elected). The need to distance oneself from local politics
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landowners considered the prospect of receiving a fair hearing in state
court so poor that they “declined to pursue their rights or ended up
throwing in the towel.”114 As Professor Epstein observed in the
context of rent regulations in New York, the demise of the state
litigation requirement means that “virtually all the constitutional
challenges to New York State’s new rent laws will be brought in
federal court to escape the strong pro-tenant bias that dominates New
York state courts.”115
However, while all of these considerations support an expectation
that takings litigants will attempt to flee the perceived pro-government
bias of state courts—arguably generating the “flood” of new federal
litigation Justice Kagan bemoaned in her Knick dissent116—they do
not bear directly on the question that aggrieved property owners are
most interested in: are those claims likely to fare any better before the
federal judiciary? The historical record in that regard is bleak.
B. The Sorry History of Federal-Court Enforcement of the Takings
Clause Offers Little Support for That View
1. For Decades, Federal Judges Have Freely Expressed Their
Distaste for Adjudicating the Constitutionality of Land Use
Restrictions.
Any supposition that federal judges have been waiting eagerly for
an opportunity to vindicate the rights of property owners and impose
takings liability on local governments is wildly at variance with the
existing record. As one commentator observed, “the federal bench’s
reluctance to decide takings cases and treatment of property rights as
secondary to other constitutional rights indicate that the usual
is often pronounced in the context of takings law”) (citation omitted); Alicia
Gonzalez & Susan L. Trevarthen, Deciding Where to Take Your Takings Case PostKnick, 49 STETSON L. REV. 539, 566 (2020) (“With land use decisions … if you are
the party whose position is not generally favored in the community, having the case
heard in federal court might be preferable.”).
114. Robert H. Thomas, Knick Analysis, Part I: After More Than 30 Years,
Supreme Court Reopens The Federal Courthouse Door To Property Owners,
INVERSECONDEMNATION.COM
(June
24,
2019),
https://www.inversecondemnation.com/inversecondemnation/2019/06/after-morethan-30-years-supreme-court-reopens-the-federal-courthouse-door-to-propertyowners.html [https://perma.cc/TY7H-WZZM].
115. Richard Epstein, A Quiet Revolution in Property Rights, RICOCHET.COM
(July 2, 2019), https://ricochet.com/636016/a-quiet-revolution-in-property-rights/
[https://perma.cc/2GPV-HVRA].
116. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S.Ct. 2162, 2189 (2019) (Kagain, J., dissenting).
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assumptions regarding federal courts’ sympathies in constitutional
cases may not apply in takings cases.”117 While it was presumably
intended tongue-in-cheek, Chief Justice Roberts’s comment to
Mrs.Rose Mary Knick’s counsel concerning the consequences of
overruling Williamson County was solidly grounded in reality:
[Y]ou can answer the letters that we’re going to get
from district court judges around the country who are
not going to be very happy learning that they now have
to adjudicate state inverse condemnation actions,
which can be fairly elaborate.118
Twenty-five years ago, the late Chief Justice Rehnquist declared that
“[w]e see no reason why the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
as much a part of the Bill of Rights as the First Amendment or Fourth
Amendment, should be relegated to the status of a poor relation.”119
Yet that sentiment has not been reflected in any observable change in
the long-standing attitudes of many federal judges, that land use
disputes are “not terribly important and somewhat beneath them.”120
Dating back to 1955, inverse condemnation claims against local
governments were routinely litigated in federal courts,121 but as the
number of such actions skyrocketed in response to increasingly
restrictive land use regulations, the keenness of federal judges to
resolve cases decreased proportionately. By the time Knick reached
the Supreme Court, the National Governors’ Association observed
that it had been “long recognized that land use disputes present
fundamentally local fights that federal courts should not referee” and
complained that overruling Williamson County “would demand that
federal courts intervene in these common, distinctly local
controversies.”122 The tone of this passage—that applying the text of
117. Kovacs, supra note 51, at 46 (1999); see also Laura D. Beaton & Matthew
D. Zinn, Knick v. Township of Scott: A Source of New Uncertainty for State and
Local Governments in Regulatory Takings Challenges to Land Use Regulation, 47
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 623, 625 (2020) (“[H]istorically, lower federal courts have been
deeply reluctant to referee land use disputes and may lack enthusiasm for a new
category of claims in that field.”).
118. Transcript of Oral Argument at 23, Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S.Ct. 2162
(2019) (No. 17-647).
119. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994).
120. Overstreet, supra note 26, at 103 (citation omitted).
121. See Sixth Camden Corp. v. Twp. of Evesham, 420 F. Supp. 709, 721 (D.
N.J., 1976) (citing cases).
122. Brief for National Governors Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
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the Constitution to protect landowners’ rights would comprise a
somewhat distasteful burden on federal judges—mirrors the language
of many decisions over the past forty years.
Federal judges have expressed a special disdain for reviewing the
application of zoning regulations for compliance with the
Constitution, often sounding as though they consider the task
unbecoming the dignity of their office. Two years before Williamson
County, the Seventh Circuit objected that the “availability of federal
review of every zoning decision would only serve to further congest
an already overburdened federal court system.”123 Another panel of
the same circuit acknowledged that it was “conceivable that a federal
lawsuit might arise out of a zoning dispute” but nevertheless grumbled
that “[t]he idea that constitutional rights are implicated in this quarrel
over the zoning rules is not one to which we would like to become
accustomed.”124
By the 1980s, the federal judiciary developed a virtual mantra,
repeated as often as necessary, to the effect that “federal courts do not
sit as zoning boards of review.”125 As the Ninth Circuit memorably
noted, it was necessary to “guard against the federal courts becoming
the Grand Mufti of local zoning boards.”126 Never was this theme
hammered home more brutally than by Judge Easterbrook in River
Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park:127
Federal Courts are not boards of zoning appeals. This
message, oft repeated, has not penetrated the
consciousness of property owners who believe that
federal judges are more hospitable to their claims than
state judges. Why they should believe this we haven’t
a clue; none has ever prevailed in this circuit.128

Respondents at 30–31, Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019) (No. 17-647).
123. Scudder v. Town of Greendale, 704 F.2d 999, 1003 (7th Cir. 1983).
124. Albery v. Reddig, 718 F.2d 245, 251 (7th Cir. 1983).
125. Spence v. Zimmerman, 873 F. 2d 256, 262 (11th Cir. 1989); see also
Raskiewicz v. Town of New Boston, 754 F.2d 38, 44 (1st Cir.1985) (“federal courts
do not sit as a super zoning board or zoning board of appeals”).
126. Hoehne v. Cty of San Benito, 870 F.2d 529, 532 (9th Cir. 1989).
127. See generally, 23 F.3d 164, 164 (7th Cir. 1994).
128. Id. at 165 (emphasis added).
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2. Abstention Offered an Inviting Way for Federal Courts to Avoid
Adjudicating Takings Cases
One reason no land-use takings claims have prevailed in Judge
Easterbrook’s Seventh Circuit (and very few in any other circuit) is
that federal judges became adept, even before Williamson County, at
diverting these cases to state court. As Michael Berger pointed out,
when Williamson County was handed down, it did not represent the
beginning of a doctrine of shunting takings cases to state court; rather,
it was the culmination of that doctrine.129
Before 1985, the preferred method employed by federal courts to
avoid adjudicating takings claims in land use cases was abstention.130
In the Ninth Circuit, federal courts began invoking Pullman abstention
to avoid adjudicating these cases even before it was possible to bring
them under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.131 There are two requirements for
abstaining under the Pullman doctrine in the Ninth Circuit.132 First,
the complaint must touch on “a sensitive area of social policy upon
which the federal courts ought not to enter unless no alternative to its
adjudication is open” (in Pullman, the racial composition of sleepingcar crews).133 Second, the case must involve an unsettled or “doubtful”
question of state law, the resolution of which may terminate the
controversy without reaching the federal constitutional issue (in
Pullman, the meaning of Article 6445 of the Texas Civil Statutes,
129. See Berger, supra note 84.
130. See Berger, Supreme Bait & Switch, supra note 53, at 100–01 (“In the old
days, judges issued abstention orders when property owners had the temerity to seek
federal court application of the federal constitution. Those orders required the
owners to repair to state court to see whether resolution of state law issues might
moot or, at least, confine the federal issues. This shunted many regulatory taking
cases into state courts.”) (Footnotes omitted). The history of pre-Williamson County
abstention in regulatory takings cases presented in this section is related in more
detail in Radford & Thompson, supra note 53, at 597–608.
131. See, e.g., Rancho Palos Verdes Corp. v. City of Laguna Beach, 547 F.2d
1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 1976). Although states and state agencies are not “persons”
subject to suit under Section 1983, municipalities and other local governmental
entities such as school districts were brought within the scope of the section by
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
132. The Pullman doctrine stems from R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312
U.S. 496 (1941), a case that challenged a Texas Railroad Commission regulation
requiring that sleeping cars on Texas trains be operated by (white) conductors, rather
than by (African-American) porters. The Supreme Court ordered a federal district
court to abstain from issuing an injunction pending a determination in state court of
the scope and meaning of the Texas statute under which the regulation was issued.
The requirements for applying the doctrine in the Ninth Circuit were set forth in
Canton v. Spokane Sch. Dist. No. 81, 498 F.2d 840, 845 (9th Cir. 1974).
133. Pullman, 312 U.S. at 498.
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under which the Commission claimed authority to issue the
regulation).134 That neither of the required elements would be
implicated in a typical regulatory takings claim did not deter federal
judges from routinely invoking the doctrine when such cases came
before them.
As early as 1976, courts in the Ninth Circuit determined that any
litigation involving local land use regulations, by definition, touched
upon a “sensitive area of social policy,” and began ordering abstention
on that basis alone.135 The other Pullman requirement an unsettled
question of state law that might resolve the controversy, effectively
fell out of the equation. A 1982 California study found that none of
the federal judges who ordered Pullman abstention in land use cases
“specified the unclear question of state law that supported
abstention.”136 Yet appellate judges in the circuit were so eager to
avoid grappling with these claims that invocations of Pullman
abstention were upheld even when the trial court identified no state
law question whatsoever that could be resolved so as to moot the
federal constitutional issue.137 On more than one occasion, Ninth
Circuit panels suggested that the existence of a possibly determinative
state-law claim was sufficient to justify Pullman abstention in takings
cases even if the claim was not raised and therefore not at issue in the
litigation.138 These rulings lend credence to speculation by the author
134. Id. at 498–500.
135. Rancho Palos Verdes Corp., 547 F.2d at 1094.
136. Theodore Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical
Study, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 482, 541–42 (1982); see also Note, Land Use
Regulation, the Federal Courts, and the Abstention Doctrine, 89 YALE L.J. 1134,
1149 (1980) (suggesting that only a minority of land use cases in federal courts
involve unclear state issues that affect constitutional claims); Brian W. Blaesser,
Closing the Federal Courthouse Door on Property Owners: The Ripeness and
Abstention Doctrines in Section 1983 Land Use Cases, 2 HOFSTRA PROP. L.J. 73, 86
(1988) (“In the majority of the decisions that apply Pullman abstention, the courts
have not addressed the extent to which the state law question is unsettled.”).
137. See Newport Invs., Inc. v. City of Laguna Beach, 564 F.2d 893, 895 (9th Cir.
1977) (“The district judge obviously believed, as we do, that the California courts
are fully capable of making a proper determination of the particular issues that they
should undertake, in the first instance, to resolve.”). Similarly, in Rancho Palos
Verdes Corp., 547 F.2d at 1095, the Ninth Circuit affirmed Pullman abstention based
on the general observation that “California courts have yet to decide the precise
extent to which the state and its municipalities may limit the development of private
property.”
138. See, e.g., Santa Fe Land Improvement Co. v. City of Chula Vista, 596 F.2d
838, 840 (9th Cir. 1979) (abstaining in part because “the state courts may possibly
find that the city has exceeded its authority based upon Cal. Gov’t Code § 65912. . .
. That Santa Fe did not specifically raise the question does not foreclose
consideration of the issue as a basis for abstention.”) (emphasis added). Accord, C-
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of the study cited above that the federal courts’ “eagerness to dispose
of cases outweigh[ed] any legitimate effort to adhere to established
doctrine.”139 This eagerness was nowhere revealed more explicitly
than in C-Y Development Co. v. City of Redlands: “were we to vacate
the abstention order and remand for proceedings on the merits, the
district court would need to decide the difficult questions of whether a
taking had occurred and what constitutional remedy or remedies
[were] required.”140 In other words, the court would be required to
exercise its Article III jurisdiction in the same manner as any other
court adjudicating any other constitutional claim.
The Ninth Circuit continued employing Pullman abstention, even
after Williamson County was decided, to dispose of takings claims that
were not barred by the state litigation requirement.141 In a 1996 case,
Sinclair Oil Corp. v. County of Santa Barbara,142 the appellate panel
remarkably acknowledged that “we cannot appropriately direct the
district court to refrain from exercising its jurisdiction over this
litigation solely because the suit involves an inverse condemnation
action.”143 But the court did so anyway, finding the claim suitable for
abstention because it involved land use planning, and the outcome of
a trial in state court would be uncertain.144
Federal courts in other circuits occasionally invoked Pullman
abstention to avoid adjudicating takings claims but not as
systematically as the Ninth Circuit.145 Beginning in 1972, the Fourth
Circuit also expressed a “strong judicial preference” to abstain from
Y Dev. Co. v. City of Redlands, 703 F.2d 375, 378 (9th Cir. 1983) (speculating that
a state court might rule in favor of the landowner under § 65912 “[a]lthough C-Y
has not raised the point.”) (emphasis added).
139. Eisenberg, supra note 137, at 542.
140. Redlands, 703 F.2d at 380.
141. In addition to the rare case in which Williamson County was waived, some
facial takings claims were considered to be exempt from the state litigation rule. See,
e.g., Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head, 724 F.3d 533, 544–47 (4th Cir. 2013) (state
litigation requirement waived by defendant’s removal of takings claim from state to
federal court); Cashman v. City of Cotati, 374 F.3d 887, 892 n.6 (9th Cir. 2004)
(facial takings claim brought under “failure to substantially advance” theory exempt
from state litigation requirement).
142. 96 F.3d 401 (9th Cir. 1996).
143. Id. at 410.
144. Id. at 409–410. As this case illustrates, in the 34 years between Williamson
County and Knick, federal courts could choose between dismissing takings claims
because state courts offered a “reasonable, certain and adequate” means of obtaining
compensation, or abstaining from adjudicating them in part because it was highly
uncertain whether state courts would in fact require compensation to be paid.
145. See, e.g., Sea Cabin on the Ocean IV Homeowners Ass’n v. City of N. Myrtle
Beach, 828 F. Supp. 1241, 1249–50 (D.S.C. 1993).
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adjudicating land-use takings cases.146 Although an early district court
opinion cautioned that abstention must be based on something more
than a mere “visceral aversion to our Article III obligation to
adjudicate,”147 that admonition was quickly forgotten. After briefly
toying with other options, Fourth Circuit courts began freely applying
Burford abstention to avoid adjudicating regulatory takings claims
against local governments.148
The Burford doctrine offered one major advantage over Pullman
abstention—from the perspective of federal courts with a “visceral
aversion” to becoming involved in messy local constitutional
squabbles. Under Pullman, the abstaining federal court retains
jurisdiction over the case during the pendency of state court
proceedings to ensure that the constitutional issue is mooted or
resolved; whereas under Burford, the federal court dismisses the case
outright, in favor of state court adjudication.149 The corresponding
disadvantage was that Burford was obviously inapplicable to most
land use takings cases. Burford applies in cases involving complex,
uniform, and statewide procedures governing an important state
interest—such as Texas’s method of allocating oil drilling rights in the
titular case—that could be disrupted by the issuance of a federal
injunction.150 Applying Burford to avoid adjudicating local land use
disputes ignores the most crucial element of the doctrine’s rationale
for abstention.151 Nevertheless, by the time Williamson County was
146. Blaesser, supra note 137, at 100.
147. Donohoe Constr. Co. v. Md.-Nat’l Cap. Park & Plan. Comm’n, 398 F. Supp.
21, 30 (D. Md. 1975).
148. See Pomponio v. Fauquier Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 21 F.3d 1319, 1327 (4th
Cir. 1994) (“Other than the initial variation in our decisions generated by the
application of Thibodaux in [Fralin & Waldron, Inc. v. City of Martinsville, 493 F.2d
481 (4th Cir. 1974)], we have applied Burford abstention to land use and zoning
cases.”). The Burford doctrine derives from Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315
(1943).
149. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 836 (6th ed. 2012).
150. See Burford, 319 U.S. at 320, 325, 333–34; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 150, at 833; LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS 512 (3d ed. 2009)
(“[Burford] [a]bstention is warranted if the exercise of federal jurisdiction will
seriously interfere with coordinated state regulatory schemes in which
administrative agencies and state courts function as partners to bring technical
expertise to bear on peculiarly complex and important local matters—involving at
least some questions of state regulatory law.”).
151. See also Note, supra note 137, at 1151–52.
[A]bstention is more appropriate in cases involving state rather than purely local
land use policies. A lesser degree of deference toward local policies is appropriate
because local governments are not restrained by the plurality of interests that
compete at the state level and can more easily be manipulated to further narrow,
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delivered, Fourth Circuit courts were abstaining in virtually all
regulatory takings cases under a hybrid Pullman-Burford rationale,
requiring no uncertainty in state law or any need for statewide
uniformity and dismissing the claims outright simply because land use
policies were deemed to be “a particularly sensitive local matter.”152
In one especially extreme rhetorical flight, the Fourth Circuit in
Pomponio v. Fauquier County Board of Supervisors justified
abstention by declaring, “We can conceive of few matters of public
concern more substantial than zoning and land use laws”—an
assertion that could hardly be taken seriously.153 While applying
Burford abstention to clear takings cases from their calendars, federal
judges in the Fourth Circuit were routinely adjudicating constitutional
challenges to the desegregation efforts of local school districts.154
Taken literally, the quoted passage from Pomponio implies that courts
in the circuit chose to exercise jurisdiction over these cases because
the operation and racial composition of local schools was considered
a matter of less substantial public concern than the application of
zoning laws. It seems far more plausible that the opposite was true,
and the widespread practice of abstaining in land-use takings cases
was based on nothing more than the fact that federal courts “simply do
not like to hear them.”155
Since Williamson County was decided, both constitutional scholars
and the Supreme Court have expressed serious reservations about the
viability of abstention as a tool for federal courts to decline exercising
their jurisdiction over takings cases. As Professor Yackle notes in his
text on federal courts, “[I]f the point of § 1983 is to empower federal
courts to enforce federal rights that state courts may fail to respect, it
is hard to justify curtailing federal judicial authority on the theory that
state courts are, after all, perfectly reliable.”156 In New Orleans Public
Service, Inc. v. Council of the City of New Orleans (“NOPSI”),157 the
Supreme Court rejected the use of Burford abstention in cases
analogous to regulatory takings claims, emphasizing that “there
parochial interests.
152. Blaesser, supra note 137, at 101.
153. 21 F.3d 1319, 1327 (4th Cir. 1994).
154. See generally, e.g., Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 269 F.3d
305, 305 (4th Cir. 2001) (applying Equal Protection Clause to local school district’s
desegregation plan).
155. Overstreet, supra note 26, at 93.
156. Yackle, supra note 151, at 521.
157. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350
(1989).
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is . . . no doctrine requiring abstention merely because resolution of a
federal question may result in the overturning of a state policy.”158
Even more closely on point was the Court’s further comment in the
same decision that “there is no doctrine that the availability . . . of state
judicial proceedings excludes the federal courts.”159 Finally, Justice
O’Connor’s unanimous opinion in Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance
Co.160 reminded the lower federal courts that the doctrine of abstention
was rooted in equity, and “federal courts have the power to dismiss or
remand cases based on abstention principles only where the relief
being sought is equitable or otherwise discretionary.”161 Because the
plaintiffs in Quackenbush sought damages instead of equitable relief,
the Court found the use of Burford abstention “unwarranted.”162
Presumably, the same reasoning would ban the use of any variety of
abstention in cases seeking damages, including takings claims
pursuing just compensation.
Nevertheless, in spite of what seems to be the Court’s clear trend of
disfavoring abstention, the amicus brief filed by the National
Governors Association in Knick warned that if the state litigation
requirement was no longer available, federal judges would likely
resume their former practice avoiding takings claims: “[I]f Williamson
County is overturned, the federal courts are likely to shunt much of
that litigation over state law questions back to the state
courts . . . . [Abstention] will happen, and the federal courts’
demonstrated reluctance to referee land-use disputes suggests it will
happen frequently.”163 For this prediction to materialize, creative
158. Id. at 363 (quoting Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 380 n.5 (1978)).
159. Id. at 373.
160. 517 U.S. 706, 732 (1996).
161. Id. at 731 (emphasis added).
162. Id.
163. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, No. 17-647, Brief of Amici National Governors
Association, et al., In Support of Respondents, at 31–33 (emphasis in original).
Several post-Knick commentators have echoed this prediction, although none have
explained how a typical inverse condemnation claim could meet any of the Supreme
Court’s current criteria for abstention. See Beaton & Zinn, supra note 118, at 636–
37; Hodges, supra note 114, at 28; Steven Eagle, Takings As Compulsory Purchase
of Commercial Units (March 4, 2020), BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. J.,
forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3548934; John
Echeverria, Knick v. Township of Scott: A Procedural Boost for Takings Claimants,
ABA SECTION OF ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY, AND RESOURCES (Dec. 20, 2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/environment_energy_resources/publications/t
rends/2019-2020/january-february-2020/knick-vs-township/
[https://perma.cc/DH2G-38W6]; Dwight Merriam, Rose Mary Knick and the Story
of Chicken Little, 47 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 639, 650–51 (2020).
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federal judges would have to find a way to circumvent the holdings of
NOPSI and Quackenbush.164 What is not clear, however, is whether
that would be worse for takings plaintiffs than having the federal
judiciary decide their cases on the merits.
3. The Mousetrap at the End of the Maze: Few Takings Claims That
Have Actually Been Adjudicated in Federal Court Have Prevailed
The rampant misuse of abstention, coupled with dismissals under
Williamson County, greatly limited the proportion of takings cases
federal courts have adjudicated over the past fifty years. Nevertheless,
the number of federal takings cases that have been decided on the
merits over this time is significant. Examining the outcome of these
lawsuits suggests that Knick’s promise of access to federal courts is
unlikely to lead to a tsunami of rulings imposing financial liability on
local governments.
The main impediment to effective protection of the Fifth
Amendment rights of property owners is the lack of any definitive,
objective standard of what constitutes a regulatory taking. Justice
Holmes’s 1922 bromide that “if regulation goes too far, it will be
recognized as a taking”165 is often ridiculed for its lack of substance,
but in fact, the Supreme Court has made virtually no progress in
refining more consistent or predictable principles to guide courts and
litigants in this field.
The Court established two categories of so-called “categorical”
takings that apply to regulations that authorize a permanent physical
occupation of property166 or deprive it of all economically viable
use.167 But the Court subsequently narrowed those holdings to the
point that they can have little, if any, practical application.168 The vast
164. In fact, in the first known instance of post-Knick abstention, a federal judge
in the Ninth Circuit simply reverted to the pre-Williamson County practice of
abstaining under Pullman because “[l]and use planning is a sensitive area of social
policy” and the outcome of state-court litigation would be uncertain. Neither NOPSI
nor Quackenbush were so much as mentioned. See EHOF Lakeside II, LLC v.
Riverside Cnty. Transp. Comm’n, et al., Case 5:19-cv-01693-JGB-SHK, Order on
Motion to Abstain 4 (C.D. CA, Nov. 27, 2019).
165. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
166. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).
167. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
168. See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 330–32 (2002) (limiting Lucas takings to those that
permanently deprive property of all value); Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519,
526–32 (1992) (finding no taking under Loretto so long as owner may be allowed to
put occupied property to some other use). A 2017 study of approximately 1,700
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majority of takings claims are therefore brought under what the Court
has described as the “polestar” of its takings jurisprudence— Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York.169
In Penn Central, the Court attempted to set out a framework for
determining when property regulations “go too far” and effect a
taking, but it failed to enunciate any objective standards for
accomplishing that task.170 The best the Court could manage was to
state, “The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant, and
particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with
distinct investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant
considerations. So, too, is the character of the governmental action.”171
Because this terminology is so vague, commentators cannot agree on
how many “relevant considerations” the Court intended to set forth for
analysis.172 As Steven Eagle put it, “The difficulty for lawyers is
figuring out how judges would apply Penn Central to their particular

categorical takings claims brought under Lucas found that only 27 succeeded – a
litigation success rate of slightly more than 1.5 percent. See Carol Necole Brown &
Dwight H. Merriam, On the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of Lucas: Making or Breaking
the Takings Claim, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1847, 1848 (2017).
169. 438 U.S. 104, 104 (1978); see Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 632–
34 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Our polestar . . . remains the principles set
forth in Penn Central.”).
170. See, e.g., R. S. Radford & Luke A. Wake, Deciphering and Extrapolating:
Searching for Sense in Penn Central, 38 ECOLOGY LQ 731, 732 (2011) (“Penn
Central enunciates at best a tenuous, ad hoc approach to assessing takings
liability.”); Mark Fenster, The Stubborn Incoherence of Regulatory Takings, 28
STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 525, 527 (2009) (attributing the Supreme Court’s lack of a
predictable takings doctrine to “Penn Central’s inherent messiness”); R. S. Radford,
Instead of a Doctrine: Penn Central as the Supreme Court’s Retreat from the Rule
of Law, in RULE OF LAW IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 173, 175 (K. Padmaja, ed., 2007)
(“It is no exaggeration to describe [the Penn Central] standards as ‘inscrutable.’”);
Lise Johnson, Note, After Tahoe Sierra, One Thing Is Clearer: There Is Still a
Fundamental Lack of Clarity, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 353, 360 (2004) (recognizing the
unworkable nature of the Penn Central test); Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations,
and Natural Property Rights, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1549, 1557 (2003) (“the Penn
Central approach is admittedly standardless”); Michael M. Berger, Tahoe Sierra:
Much Ado About-What?, 25 U. HAW. L. REV. 295, 314 (2003) (referring to the Penn
Central balancing test as an “unworkable . . . lot-by-lot, fact-by-fact method of
adjudication . . . so fraught with uncertainty that landowners must often litigate to
the highest court that will hear them out to determine whether they have even
properly stated a claim on which relief can be granted.”).
171. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124 (citation omitted).
172. See, e.g., Steven J. Eagle, The Four-Factor Penn Central Regulatory Takings
Test, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 601 (2014) (analyzing Penn Central as a four-factor test
for takings liability).
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facts. The difficulty for judges is figuring out what Penn Central really
means.”173
The record suggests that what Penn Central really means to most
federal judges is that the government wins. In 2013, Adam Pomeroy
published a comparative analysis of the treatment of Penn Central
claims in the First, Ninth, and Federal Circuits.174 He found that, in the
three Circuits combined, only four plaintiffs prevailed on the merits
on a regulatory takings claim under Penn Central.175 None of the four
cases challenged the constitutionality of land use regulations, and only
one (brought against the federal government) involved real property
at all.176 Pomeroy’s data showed that while the rate of success for
takings claims in the district courts was low to begin with (around
18%), those relatively few rulings in favor of plaintiffs were likely to
be reversed on appeal.177
Although the language of Penn Central seems to imply that courts
should balance, or at least compare, three different aspects of a
restrictive land use regulation—its “character,” its economic impact,
and its effect on a landowner’s investment-backed expectations—
federal judges have shown a marked tendency to decide takings cases
in favor of the government if any one of these factors weighs in the
defendant’s favor.178 An especially pernicious development in the
1990s was the widespread use of Penn Central’s reference to
investment-backed expectations to defeat takings claims on nothing
more than a showing that the property in question (or type of property
in question) was subject to some degree of regulation before the owner
acquired title or sought approval for development.179 This doctrine,
which came to be called the “Notice Rule,”180 became so extreme that
some federal courts dismissed takings claims on the basis that the
173. Steven Eagle, Penn Central and Its Reluctant Muftis, 66 BAYLOR L. REV. 1,
2 (2014); see also Luke A. Wake, Check Your Rights at the Door: Rethinking
Confiscatory Regulation (Aug. 14, 2019), at 7, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3437488
[https://perma.cc/FMM8-NL34], (“[O]ne might even argue that the Penn Central
test provides no judicially manageable standard at all.”).
174. See Adam R. Pomeroy, Penn Central After 35 Years: A Three Part Balancing
Test or a One Strike Rule?, 22 FED. CIR. B.J. 677 (2013).
175. Id. at 692.
176. Id. at 694–95.
177. Id. at 697–98.
178. Id. at 689.
179. See generally, R. S. Radford & J. David Breemer, Great Expectations: Will
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island Clarify the Murky Doctrine of Investment-Backed
Expectations in Regulatory Takings Law?, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 449 (2001).
180. See, e.g., Steven J. Eagle, The Regulatory Takings Notice Rule, 24 U. HAW.
L. REV. 533, 533 (2002).
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landowner should have known (in the court’s opinion) that restrictions
were likely to be imposed in the future.181
In Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, the Supreme Court finally stepped in
to put an end to these abuses.182 This case involved wetland
regulations that prevented Anthony Palazzolo from making any
beneficial use of eighteen acres of undeveloped property.183 Palazzolo
originally purchased the land through a closely-held corporation, but
when the corporate charter was revoked in 1978, he personally
acquired title to the parcel by operation of law.184 The Rhode Island
Supreme Court held that Palazzolo could not claim the regulations
effected a taking under Penn Central because the restrictive regulatory
scheme was already in place by the time he acquired title in his own
name.185 Accordingly, the State’s highest court affirmed the trial
court’s conclusion that “a regulatory takings claim may not be
maintained whe[n] the regulation predates the acquisition of the
property.”186
Granting certiorari, the Supreme Court forcefully repudiated the
rule that a “purchaser or a successive title holder” can be barred from
challenging a previously enacted regulation under the Takings Clause
simply by having notice of the restrictions.187 Recognizing that such a
doctrine would effectively allow the government to regulate private
property out of existence by the mere passage of time, Justice Kennedy
memorably declared, “[t]he State may not put so potent a Hobbesian
stick into the Lockean bundle.”188 He continued:
Were we to accept the State’s rule, the post-enactment
transfer of title would absolve the State of its obligation
to defend any action restricting land use, no matter how
extreme or unreasonable. A State would be allowed, in
181. See Dist. Intown Props., Ltd. P’Ship v. Dist. of Columbia, 198 F.3d 874,
883 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that the plaintiffs “could have reasonably expected”
that they would not be able to develop their commercial real estate, given the
existence of a law authorizing the Fine Arts Commission to make recommendations
about actions affecting the public values of the National Zoo); Good v. United States,
189 F.3d 1355, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“In light of the growing consciousness of and
sensitivity toward environmental issues, [the landowner] must also have been aware
that standards could change to his detriment”).
182. 533 U.S. 606, 606 (2001).
183. Id. at 615.
184. Id. at 613–14.
185. Id. at 616.
186. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 746 A.2d 707, 715 (R.I. 2000).
187. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 626.
188. Id. at 627.
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effect, to put an expiration date on the Takings Clause.
This ought not to be the rule. Future generations, too,
have a right to challenge unreasonable limitations on
the use and value of land.189
Writing in concurrence, Justice O’Connor emphasized that “the
Rhode Island Supreme Court erred in effectively adopting the
sweeping rule that the preacquisition enactment of the use restriction
ipso facto defeats any takings claim based on that use restriction.”190
She elaborated that the date of adoption of restrictive land use
regulations should rightly be considered as merely one factor among
many in determining the impact of the restrictions on a given owner’s
investment-backed expectations—which in turn remained “one of a
number of factors that a court must examine” to determine whether
there has been a Penn Central taking.191
The Palazzolo Court was emphatic in holding that mere notice of
the prior existence of regulation, without more, is not sufficient to
defeat a takings claim under Penn Central.192 But the allure of the
now-discredited Notice Rule as a quick and simple way to dispose of
such cases, while supposedly complying with Penn Central, proved
too much for some federal courts to resist. The Ninth Circuit, in
particular, exhumed that doctrine and enshrined it as the law of the
circuit, notwithstanding its express repudiation in Palazzolo.
4. Guggenheim v. Goleta Illustrates the Lengths to Which Federal
Courts Have Gone to Avoid Imposing Takings Liability on Local
Governments
The paradigm example of the Ninth Circuit’s resurrection of prePalazzolo notice doctrine is Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, a challenge
to the constitutionality of rent control in a mobile home park.193
189. Id.
190. Id. at 632 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
191. Id. at 633–36.
192. Justice Scalia would have gone further, opining that, in his view, “the fact
that a restriction existed at the time the purchaser took title . . . should have no
bearing upon the determination of whether the restriction is so substantial as to
constitute a taking. The ‘investment-backed expectations’ that the law will take into
account do not include the assumed validity of a restriction that in fact deprives
property of so much of its value as to be unconstitutional.” Id. at 637 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
193. Guggenheim I, 582 F.3d 996, 999 (9th Cir. 2009), reh’g en banc granted,
vacated by, Guggenheim II, 638 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2010).
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Regulations of this sort are widespread in California, and their effect
in practice is to carry out what two appellate judges have aptly
described as a “naked” wealth transfer from park owners to their
tenants.194 This process has been well documented by economists,
both theoretically and empirically, for more than thirty years.195
The Guggenheim plaintiffs challenged an especially stringent rent
ordinance that created such a windfall for their tenants that nearly 90%
of the resale value of coaches sold in the park consisted of the
discounted present value of below-market rents.196 This one-time
wealth transfer to residents who owned coaches in the park at the time
rent control was enacted came at the cost of up to $100,000 per space
in reduced revenue to the park.197
When the regulatory takings claim reached the Ninth Circuit, the
panel opinion by Judge Bybee could serve as a primer on the
application of Penn Central as a three-factor balancing test.198
Looking first at the economic impact of the regulation, the court cited
evidence that the rent ordinance depressed park revenues to nearly
80% below the market.199 The character of the government action
consisted of a one-time wealth transfer from the park owners to the
tenants in occupancy at the time the ordinance was adopted.200 As
such, Goleta’s rent control law was a classic example of a regulation
that effected “the distribution of resources or opportunities to one
group rather than another solely on the ground that those favored have
exercised the raw political power to obtain what they want.”201 Finally,
194. See Guggenheim I, 582 F.3d at 1021; Guggenheim II, 638 F.3d at 1136 (Bea,
J., dissenting).
195. See, e.g., Diehang Zheng ET AL., An examination of the impact of rent control
on mobile home prices in California, 16 J. HOUSING ECON. 209 (2007); Carl Mason
& John Quigley, The Curious Institution of Mobile Home Rent Control: An Analysis
of Mobile Home Parks in California (U. C. Berkeley Program on Housing and Urban
Policy, June 1, 2006); David Dale-Johnson ET AL., An Examination of the Impact of
Rent Control on Mobile Home Prices in California, Working Paper No. 2004-1010,
Lusk Center for Real Estate, University of Southern California (Sept. 2006); Werner
Z. Hirsch & Anthony M. Rufolo, The Regulation of Immobile Housing Assets Under
Divided Ownership, 19 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 383 (1999); Werner Z. Hirsch & Joel
G. Hirsch, Legal-Economic Analysis of Rent Controls in a Mobile Home Context:
Placement Values and Vacancy Decontrol, 35 UCLA L. REV. 399 (1988); Werner
Z. Hirsch, An Inquiry into Effects of Mobile Home Park Rent Control, 24 J. URB.
ECON. 212 (1988).
196. Guggenheim II, 638 F.3d at 1134.
197. Guggenheim I, 582 F.3d at 1023.
198. See Pomeroy, supra note 175, at 700–02.
199. Guggenheim I, 582 F.3d at 1020.
200. Id. at 1021.
201. Id. (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84
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Judge Bybee noted that the existence of the county’s rent ordinance
prior to the Guggenheims’ purchase of the park minimized any
purported interference with their investment-backed expectations.202
Still, Palazzolo established that mere preexistence of a regulatory
scheme cannot, without more, foreclose a successful challenge to
those regulations under the Takings Clause.203 In this case, because
the economic impact and character of the regulations weighed heavily
in the plaintiffs’ favor, the Guggenheims established that the rent
ordinance effected a compensable taking under Penn Central. In a
passage reminiscent of Justice Holmes’s opinion in Pennsylvania Coal
v. Mahon,204 the Guggenheim majority concluded:
If the City of Goleta wishes to attempt to increase the
availability of affordable housing by transferring the
value of renting land within its jurisdiction from the
Park Owners to the incumbent tenants, there is no
constitutional impediment to doing so. The Fifth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, however,
requires that the City compensate the Park Owners for
taking their property by regulation.205
But that victory was short-lived. Granting the City’s request for
rehearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit in 2010 handed down a new
opinion rescinding and reversing the panel’s holding.206 In place of
Judge Bybee’s careful weighing of the three independent Penn
Central factors, the en banc opinion by Judge Kleinfeld collapsed the
entire analysis into a single “primary” consideration that he found
“fatal to the Guggenheims’ claim”—that the park was subject to the
county rent control ordinance before the Guggenheims acquired
title.207 Holding that the pre-acquisition existence of regulation—even
a different regulation—completely destroys any possible expectation
that an unconstitutional enactment might be overturned, the en banc
COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1689 (1984)).
202. Id. at 1023–24.
203. Id. at 1005 (citing Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 630 (2001)).
204. See Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922) (“We are in
danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not
enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way
of paying for the change.”)
205. Guggenheim I, 582 F.3d at 1030.
206. Guggenheim II, 638 F.3d 1111, 1137 (9th Cir. 2010).
207. Id. at 1120.
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opinion in every respect embraced the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s
reasoning in Palazzolo, which was forcefully repudiated by the
Supreme Court a decade earlier.208 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit went
further, suggesting that the Guggenheims’ tenants had distinct,
investment-backed expectations amounting to a constitutionally
protected property interest in the indefinite continuation of restrictive
rent control.209 This novel interpretation of Penn Central’s
expectations prong runs directly contrary to Justice Scalia’s
observation in Palazzolo—that legally cognizable expectations “do
not include the assumed validity of a restriction that in fact deprives
property of so much of its value as to be unconstitutional.”210
By adopting the discredited Notice Rule as the law in Guggenheim,
the Ninth Circuit carved out a potentially vast swath of land use
regulations that, although they might have been flagrantly
unconstitutional when they were enacted, become immune to takings
challenges on a parcel-by-parcel basis as regulated property changes
hands. This is the process Justice Kennedy refers to in Palazzolo as
“put[ting] an expiration date on the Takings Clause.”211 Such is the
force of the doctrine that, despite Penn Central’s insistence that
takings liability depends upon “ad hoc, factual inquiries” into the
particular circumstances of each case,212 those facts become irrelevant
in cases involving pre-acquisition regulations. An extreme illustration
is MHC Financing Limited Partnership v. City of San Rafael—another
challenge to mobile home park rent control in which the district court
found a regulatory taking based on a detailed factual record compiled
over eight years of litigation.213 Before reversing under the Notice
208. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 746 A.2d 707, 715–17 (R.I. 2000). The
Guggenheim en banc opinion effectively limited the Supreme Court’s ruling to its
facts, finding it dispositive that title to Palazzolo’s land passed by operation of law,
from corporate to individual ownership, while Palazzolo was applying for permits –
facts that played no role whatsoever in the Supreme Court’s holding. Guggenheim
II, 638 F.3d at 1118.
209. Guggenheim II, 638 F.3d at 1122.
210. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 637 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring).
211. Id. at 627. By suggesting that federal courts should afford constitutional
protection to “investments” in legislative wealth transfers, Judge Kleinfeld’s
Guggenheim opinion undermines the role of the judiciary in maintaining a stable
system of private property rights. See J. David Breemer & R. S. Radford, The (Less?)
Murky Doctrine of Investment-Backed Expectations after Palazzolo, and the Lower
Courts’ Disturbing Insistence on Wallowing in the Pre-Palazzolo Muck, 34 Sw. U.
L. REV. 351, 417–25 (2005) (providing an elaboration of how rulings of this kind
promote the phenomenon Bryan Caplan has dubbed “rational irrationality”).
212. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
213. 714 F.3d 1118, 1123–24 (9th Cir. 2013).
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Rule on appeal, the Ninth Circuit joked that “it [is] déjà vu all over
again.”214 As in Guggenheim, the MHC Financing court found that the
existence of (substantially different) rent regulations prior to the
plaintiff’s acquisition of the park not only eliminated any reasonable
expectation that the ordinance could be found unconstitutional but also
resolved the other two Penn Central factors in favor of the
government.215
The misapplication of Penn Central’s investment-backed
expectations inquiry under the Notice Rule—in direct contravention
of Palazzolo—has not been confined to the Ninth Circuit; although
Guggenheim is the only instance in which that doctrine has been
elevated to the law of the circuit by an en banc panel.216 With the
demise of Williamson County, however, the attraction of this option as
a way to clear takings cases from federal court dockets may prove even
more compelling.
5. Epilogue: The Ninth Circuit Becomes Both Judge and Jury in
Takings Cases
Ten years after Guggenheim, and after this Article had been
submitted for publication, a Ninth Circuit panel reversed a jury verdict
awarding damages for a temporary regulatory taking in Bridge Aina
Le’a v. State of Hawaii Land-Use Commission.217 The property at
issue consisted of 1,060 acres of barren land covered with rough, rocky
lava flow.218 The Hawaii Land-Use Commission (“LUC”) zoned the
property for agricultural use until 1989 when it was upgraded to
“urban usage” at the owner’s request to allow for development.219 The
land’s current owner, Bridge Aina Le’a (“Bridge”), invested $20
million in the project when the LUC (illegally, as was later
determined) “reverted” the property’s zoning to agricultural use—for
214. Id. at 1122.
215. Id. at 1127–28.
216. See, e.g., CRV Enters. v. United States, 656 F. 3d 1241, 1248–50 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (subsequent purchaser lacks standing to challenge implementation of
previously-enacted measure restricting access to property); D.A.B.E., Inc., v. City
of Toledo, 292 F. Supp. 2d 968, 972 (N.D. Ohio 2003), aff’d on other grounds, 393
F.3d 692 (2005) (holding that businesses challenging smoking ban lacked reasonable
expectations because they had “long been on notice that the value of their
investments, and implicitly, the ability to profit from such businesses, may be
affected adversely by continuing governmental efforts to reduce exposure to secondhand smoke.”).
217. 950 F.3d 610, 610–11 (9th Cir. 2020).
218. Id. at 617–18.
219. Id. at 618–19.
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all practical purposes—the equivalent of designating the site for open
space.220 This eliminated the land’s value for development, and caused
a pending $40.7 million sale of part of the project to fall through.221
Some five years after LUC designated the property for agricultural
use, Bridge prevailed when the Hawaii Supreme Court invalidated the
order of reversion.222 Subsequently, in an action removed to federal
court by the State, Bridge sued for a temporary taking, alleging LUC’s
actions gave rise to liability for compensation under both Penn Central
and Lucas.223 After an eight-day jury trial, the district court agreed.
The jury found that the property was deprived of all economically
viable use for the time the agricultural zoning was in place, thus
meeting the Supreme Court’s standard for a Lucas taking. Turning to
the Penn Central factors, the fact that LUC’s reversion order was
unlawful and may have been intended to “force Bridge to sell the
[p]roperty to another owner/developer” tipped the character of the
government action in favor of a taking.224 The jury determined that the
economic impact of the reversion was significant based on expert
testimony that the property lost 83.5% of its market value when it was
designated for agricultural use.225 Finally, evidence considered by the
jury indicated that Bridge had a reasonable, investment-backed
expectation of selling the property for $40 million under the urban
zoning category, but those expectations were shattered when the
LUC’s illegal reversion dropped the value of the parcel to $6.6 million,
causing the sale to fall through.226
Denying the Commission’s post-trial motion for judgment as a
matter of law, the trial judge reviewed all elements of the jury’s
finding and found them to be reasonable in light of the jury
instructions that both sides agreed upon and supported by credible
evidence in the record.227 The Ninth Circuit reversed on appeal,
holding that “no reasonable jury” could find a taking on these facts.228
In so doing, the appellate panel extensively reweighed and reevaluated
220. Id. at 622; DW Aina Le’a Dev., LLC v. Bridge Aina Le’a, LLC, 339 P.3d
685, 712 (Haw. 2014).
221. Bridge Aina Le’a, 950 F.3d at 620–21, 633.
222. See DW Aina Le’a Dev., 339 P.3d 685–86.
223. Bridge Aina Le’a, 950 F.3d at 623–24.
224. See Order Den. Haw.’s Renewed Mot. J. as a Matter of L. or, New Trial at
66; Bridge Aina Le’a v. Haw. Land-Use Comm’n, 950 F.3D 610 (2020) (No. 1:11–
cv–00414–SOM–KJM), 2018 WL 3149489, at *24.
225. See generally Order, supra note 225 at 56.
226. Id. at 63–64.
227. See generally id at 66.
228. Bridge Aina Le’a, LLC, 950 F.3d at 637.
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the evidence before the trial court, going so far as to substitute its own
opinion of the credibility of witnesses for the jury’s evaluation.229
The tone of the appellate opinion is exemplified by the panel’s
finding that Bridge’s property was not in fact deprived of all
economically viable use, as the jury had determined, in part because
one expert sarcastically commented that the lava-covered parcel could
still be used for “growing rocks.”230 As to the Penn Central factors,
the court disputed the expert testimony that was presented to the jury,
relying instead upon its own speculations as to when the economic
impact of the reversion began and ended.231 Under this evaluation of
the evidence, as opposed to the jury’s, the economic impact of the
reversion was limited to a single year instead of five, thereby reducing
the diminution in the property’s value to $6.72 million.232
Concerning the effect of the reversion on Bridge’s investmentbacked expectations, the Ninth Circuit invoked an even more
amorphous version of the long-discredited Notice Rule than the one
resurrected in Guggenheim.233 Here, it was undisputed that Bridge
owned the property at the time the Commission downzoned it to
agricultural use. But the Ninth Circuit looked to the “regulatory
environment” at the time Bridge acquired the parcel, citing prePalazzolo caselaw for the proposition that “those who do business in
the regulated field cannot object” when subsequent regulations destroy
the economic viability of their property.234 Bridge’s $20 million
229. See, e.g., id. at 631 (complaining that the parties – and, by implication, the
jury – “agree, uncritically” on the meaning of an expert witness’s testimony at trial,
whereupon the appellate panel substitutes its own analysis of the facts for the
expert’s).
230. Id. at 630.
231. Id. at 631–33. This was reminiscent of the economic speculations of the
Guggenheim en banc panel, which simply proclaimed that the purchase price of the
plaintiffs’ mobile home park “doubtless” fully discounted the expectation of
perpetual rent control – an important question of fact essential to the panel’s
reasoning, but for which the record contained no evidence whatsoever. Guggenheim
II, 638 F.3d 1111, 1120 (9th Cir. 2010).
232. Bridge Aina Le’a, LLC, 950 F.3d at 632.
233. See supra text accompanying notes 208–10.
234. Bridge Aina Le’a, LLC, 950 F.3d at 634 (citing Concrete Pipe & Prods. v.
Constr. Laborers Pension Tr., 508 U.S. 602, 645 (quoting FHA v. The Darlington,
Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 91 (1958))). For other pre-Palazzolo applications of this
“anticipatory taking” doctrine, see Dist. Intown Props., Ltd. P’Ship v. Dist. of
Columbia, 198 F.3d 874, 883 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that the plaintiffs “could
have reasonably expected” that they would not be able to develop their commercial
real estate, given the existence of a law authorizing the Fine Arts Commission to
make recommendations about actions affecting the public values of the National
Zoo); Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“In light of the
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investment in developing the property was dismissed as irrelevant;
“we do not see,” as the court put it, “what this proves.”235 Because the
Commission had the statutory authority to revert the land’s
designation to agricultural in mid-development, even if it did so
illegally, “this factor weighs strongly against finding a taking.”236
The appellate panel grudgingly conceded that the illegality of the
Commission’s action, and its apparent motivation of forcing Bridge to
dispose of the property, might conceivably be interpreted as weighing
in favor of takings liability under Penn Central’s “character” prong.237
But under the panel’s reevaluation and reweighing of the evidence, the
reversion’s economic impact on Bridge’s investment-backed
expectations were found to “weigh decisively against such a
finding,”238 and “no reasonable jury” could have come to any other
conclusion.239
The Supreme Court has repeatedly admonished that takings liability
depends on a case-by-case, ad-hoc, fact-intensive inquiry240—a
function that is traditionally entrusted to juries.241 Indeed, the Court
has specifically held that whether the facts of a given case meet the
Penn Central standards is a question that should be determined by a
jury.242 Nevertheless, this was not the first time the Ninth Circuit set
aside a jury’s verdict of takings liability by reevaluating the evidence
considered at trial and substituting its own factual determinations.243
growing consciousness of and sensitivity toward environmental issues, [the
landowner] must also have been aware that standards could change to his
detriment”).
235. Bridge Aina Le’a, LLC, 950 F.3d at 635.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 635–37.
238. Id. at 637.
239. Id.
240. See, e.g., Penn Central Trans. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001).
241. “The function of jury is to determine the facts based solely on a fair
consideration of the evidence. The jury determines what evidence to accept, how
important any evidence is and what conclusions to draw from all the evidence,”
USLEGAL, https://courts.uslegal.com/jury-system/the-function-of-the-jury-at-thetrial/ [https://perma.cc/8A56-HHZA]; see also United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S.
506, 512 (1995) (“the application of legal standard-to-fact sort of question[s] ha[ve]
typically been resolved by juries”); TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S.
438, 450 (1976) (recognizing that a jury is well suited to weigh the “delicate
assessments of the inferences a ‘reasonable [decisionmaker]’ would draw from a
given set of facts”).
242. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 720–21
(determination of loss of economically viable use “is for the jury” to decide.).
243. See Colony Cove Props. v. City of Carson, 888 F.3d 445, 449, n.3, 455 (9th
Cir. 2018) (Although both the jury and the trial judge independently weighed the
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This raises a serious question of whether the Ninth Circuit in these
cases is flouting the Seventh Amendment’s Reexamination Clause:
“[N]o fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court
of the United States, than according to the rules of the common
law.”244 As Professor Tribe noted, the Reexamination Clause “was
adopted principally to protect jury verdicts from after-the-fact judicial
interference, especially by appellate courts.”245 Yet this after-the-fact
questioning of jury findings forms the core of the Ninth Circuit’s
opinion in Bridge Aina Le’a. Bridge’s petition for certiorari to the
Supreme Court raised this point, but the prospects of granting review
on that basis seem slight.246
IV. CONCLUSION: A NEW DAY OR . . . ?
Senator Whitehouse’s anti-Knick diatribe saw the decision as
signaling a “new day” in which federal judges would impose financial
liability on local governments under the Takings Clause with gay
abandon.247 This vision comports with a widely shared perception that
federal judges—whose opportunity to adjudicate takings claims was
severely limited by Williamson County—will be inherently more
inclined to uphold property owners’ constitutional rights than their
colleagues in the state judiciary. However, as this Article has shown
there is little empirical support for this belief.
The hostility of state judges to takings claims against local
governments may be, as has been widely assumed, a function of the
local political process of which they are inherently involved. But this
does not necessarily imply that eliminating those pressures will
eliminate the hostility. This Article demonstrated that federal courts
have their own incentives for discouraging litigants from pursuing
claims for Takings Clause violations. In particular, the often-voiced
distaste of federal judges for adjudicating local land use disputes may
manifest itself in the observed tendency to rule in favor of government
defendants if they can prevail on any one of Penn Central’s three

evidence and found the facts supported a finding of takings liability, the Ninth
Circuit reevaluated the same evidence, substituting its own opinions of credibility
for those of the trial court, and concluded that “no reasonable finder of fact” could
have found a taking had occurred.).
244. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
245. LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 624 (3d ed., 2000).
246. See Pet. for Writ of Cert. at 31, Bridge Aina Le’a, LLC v. Hawaii Land-Use
Comm’n, (No. 20-54) (2020).
247. See Whitehouse, supra note 96.
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elements for establishing takings liability.248 As Robert Thomas has
observed:
Knick’s critical recognition that the federal courts
should be open to protect the federal constitutional
rights of property owners will have little impact if all it
means is that owners can now go to federal court and
invariably lose, simply because the prevailing standard
is so open to interpretation that it can support any
reason to deny a claim.249
Or, as another leading land-use practitioner put it, “Knick may only
mean that takings plaintiffs will be able to lose their cases more
quickly.”250
In effect, Knick returned federal takings jurisprudence to where it
stood in 1984, before Williamson County’s ill-conceived shunting of
most cases to state court. How the law develops from here, and what
sort of regulatory takings doctrine is developed by judges holding life
tenure, free of local political pressure, remains to be seen.

248. See supra, notes 118–29, 179.
249. Robert H. Thomas, Here Be Dragons: New Amicus Brief Asks For A “Fresh
Look” At The Penn Central Test, INVERSECONDEMNATION.COM (Sep. 17, 2019),
https://www.inversecondemnation.com/inversecondemnation/2019/09/here-bedragons-new-amicus-brief-asks-for-a-fresh-look-at-the-penn-central-test.html
[https://perma.cc/DG7P-J8C7].
250. Merriam, supra note 164, at 650.

